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HOWCLEVER
 
WAS THE OLD FOX?
 
LAWRENCE FINSEN 






Michael A. Fox has recently recanted the 
views he published in Th e Case for Animal" 
Experi mentation. His admissions that the 
thesis of his book was arbitrary and the view 
expressed arrogant are as eloquent and moving 
as they are unusual. Why then, if the author 
has renounced the position of the book, would a 
discussion of it be of interest? The most 
obvious reason is that the book will stand on 
its own, regardless of the author's current 
position, to do whatever good or ill books can 
do. There will inevitably be those who 
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maintain that the old Fox is wiser than the new 
one, as there are those who prefer the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus to the 
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical 
Investigations. Additionally, there are certain 
lessons to be learned from careful examination 
of this book that go beyond the arbitrariness 
and arrogance of its thesis, and so are all the 
more likely to be passed over in the wake of 
Fox's renunciation. 
Jim Harter, Animals: ~ 
cooyright-FreeT!IUstratl.ons. 
New rork~ DOver, 1979 
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How can even those who disagree with Fox's 
defense of research learn from this book? Fox 
was clearly a spokesperson for the research 
community, and he listened well to their 
arguments. By reading this book, it is possible 
to familiarize oneself with the concerns, 
attitudes and defensive moves of the research 
commu nity, and thus prepare for discussion 
with researchers and their sympathizers. 
More specifically, it is possible to understand 
the kind of distorted image of animal rights 
arguments and concepts the opposition 
presents. It's also important to understand 
how scientists view scientific inquiry and their 
reasons for conducting research. 
It is often difficult to see that commCJn sense 
does not make sense until someone comes along 
and tries to defend it. Perhaps the greatest 
opportunity provided by this book is the 
opportunity to see the received view about 
animals in the refreshing light provided by its 
attempted defense. An important place to 
begin is on the alleged virtue of finding the 
middle ground, of avoiding extremes. Fox aims 
to provide a reasonable defense of "traditional 
wisdom" on the moral status of animals: the 
"moderate" position that nonhuman animals, 
while certainly not full members of the moral 
community, do have interests that should be 
considered. This philosophical stance leads, in 
the end, to a defense of current scientific uses 
of animals with few caveats. In spelling out 
the rationale behind traditional wisdom Fox 
inadvertently lays bare the shaky foundations 
of moderation. For lack of an extant term, we 
dub this preference for the middle ground the 
"fallacy of veritas in media." It is Fox's own 
analysis of science and his attempt to spell out 
what a moderate can say about the wrongness 
of cruelty that lead us to see why moderation 
isn't a viable position as applied to animal 
experimentation. 
The Case for Animal Experimentation can 
usefully be divided into two sections: in the 
first part of the book Fox looks at issues 
preparatory to thinking about the experimental 
use of animals: he focuses on our 
responsibilities to animals, including a 
consideration of common fallacies in thinking 
about animals; he attempts to set the record 
straight about animals from an evolutionary 
perspective, and he offers a philosophical 
discussion of the moral status of animals for 
which the previous two chapters presumably 
prepared us. The second half of the book looks 
specifically at scientific uses of animals, 
considering examples of some disputed 
research in greater detail than these are 
usually presented, a discussion of the nature of 
scientific inquiry and the appropriate place of 
animals within that framework, and a 
consideration of the ethical restraint placed on 
researchers by the familiar (and much 
criticized) injunction to avoid inflicting 
unnecessary suffering. Fox concludes the book 
by making a number of recommendations which 
try to accommodate some concerns relating to 
laboratory abuse of animals. 
CLEARING THE AIR 
Fox attempts to set the background of the 
moral issues by discussing irrational attitudes 
toward animals---an air-clearing effort, so to 
speak. Numerous irrationalities of his 
opposition are identified, from the expression 
of approval of violence against researchers to 
ignoring the pressing needs of human suffering 
in favor of that of animals. One could qUibqle 
with the details of his account of such 
irrationnalities, such as the unsupported claim 
that campaigns on behalf of children go 
starving while the coffers of animals are 
bursting, but the underlying issue here is more 
significant than the factual misinformation 
provided. For to make an issue of this alleged 
disparity as an expression of irrational 
attitudes over these issues simply begs the 
question, assuming without argument that the 
only rational approach is to place all concerns 
regarding humans over those concerning 
animals. Here Fox assumes rather 
immoderately that any concern about human 
ills is more significant than that regarding 
animals, no matter what the nature of the ill 
is. And beyond this prejudice, the choice is 
posed as a dilemma---a false dilemma we 
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hasten to add---that one must either spend 
one's time, money, energy and anxiety over 
humans or over animals. Needless to say the 
list of those who have succeeded at keeping 
their eyes on both is not limited to Henry Salt 
and Mohatma Gandhi. 
THE "EVOLUTIONARY" PERsPECTIVE 
The subtitle of Fox's book is "An Evolutionary 
and Ethical Perspective." This subtitle 
naturally would lead one to believe that the 
perspective on the human species and its 
relation to other animals offered by 
Evolutionary Theory is an important aspect of 
the book. Chapter Two, entitled, "An 
Evolutionary Perspective on Humans and 
Animals," offers something quite different. 
For here we find Fox arguing against the 
Darwinian view of the continuity of Homo 
sapiens and other species, and for the view 
that humans are unique. Specifically, Fox 
distinguishes three views: 
"(1) that humans are totally unique; (2) that 
humans possess characteristics that are 
unique, but only in superficial and insignificant 
ways (unique in degree perhaps, but not in 
kind); and (3) that although not totally unique, 
humans are 'still different from all other 
animals in significant respects (they possess 
characteristics that are different in kind, not 
just in degree). [32] 
Fox quickly dissociates himself from the first 
position, which is now associated with 
"creationism" and "thoroughly outmoded and 
deservingly discredited." The second view he 
quite rightly associates with Charles Darwin, 
who, as he points out, viewed the difference 
between the mental capacities of humans and 
other animals to be a difference of degree and 
not of kind. The third is his own view. It 
would, in our view, have been more accurate 
to subtitle the book, "A Rejoinder to the 
Evolutionary Perspective." For, the 
essentialist notion of difference in kind is an 
Aristotelian notion which is fundamentally at 
odds with the evolutionary perspective. For 
Darwin, and for modern evolutionists as well, 
the notion of species difference is a highly 
pragmatic notion, like the notion of variety. 
Fox must think that by detailing the impressive 
genetic and behavioral commonalities between 
human beings and other species, and by 
admitting that Evolutionary Theory is 
undoubtedly true, he is entitled to claim that he 
has an "evolutionary perspective." But even 
the title of the section in which he discusses 
these issues, "Similarities Between Animals 
and Homo Sapiens," belies the fundamental 
insight of Evolutionary Theory regarding the 
human species: namely, we are animals. 
It is clear that Fox needs the notion of 
difference in kind to justify the difference in 
kind of moral considerability offered for 
Homo sapiens over all other species. He does 
not wish to rest this difference upon anyone 
characteristic but to discuss a host of 
characteristics, including a highly developed 
brain, a precision grip, sophisticated language 
usage, ability to critically reflect upon 
oneself, etc. Possession of anyone of these 
characteristics by itself may only represent a 
difference of degree compared to one who 
lacks them, but when they are all combined the 
difference becomes one of kind. Ultimately, 
this is because these characteristics combine 
to make humans free in a way that other 
organisms are not: humans are agents capable 
of fully self-conscious, voluntary and 
deliberate action. [45] This autonomy 
ultimately becomes the focus of Fox's claim 
that humans are truly unique, and that their 
uniqueness matters morally. 
Let us leave aside for the moment the 
questions whether autonomy even if it were a 
unique feature of our species, would be the 
sort of difference needed by Fox to motivate 
the difference in moral status he advocates. 
What are his grounds for claiming that humans 
are uniquely autonomous? While Fox mentions 
a variety of characteristics as important in 
making humans autonomous, he rests most 
weight on human linguistic ability. [42] He 
quotes Stephen Walker approvingly: 
"Of all the discontinuties between man and 
animals that could be quoted, . . . the 
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evergreen candidate for the fundamental 
discontinuity. . . is language. . ..It is still 
reasonable to say that animals do not think as 
we do, when we think in words, and that in so 
far as we are only conscious when we think in 
words, they lack conscious awareness." [42] 
It is remarkable to find such a Cartesian view 
of consciousness being promoted in the 20th 
Century, but Fox doesn't press this absurd 
idea, merely winking in its general direction. 
What he does imply is that linguistic ability is 
central in producing autonomy and is also the 
best criterion for its presence. He says, 
"When I speak of an autonomous being I mean 
one that is critically self-aware and has the 
capacity to manipulate concepts in complex 
ways, use a sophisticated language, reflect, 
plan, deliberate, choose, and accept 
responsibility for acting. In other words, an 
autonomous being can act freely, choose and 
decide rationally in the fullest sense, and 
engage in self-making or self-realizing 
activities." [45] 
Of course, if you include in the meaning of 
autonomy sophisticated linguistic ability, your 
have an easy time showing that humans are 
uniquely autonomous. Other evidence of self­
awareness gets ruled out by fiat. Fox says, 
"saying that human beings are critically self­
aware does not just mean that, apelike, they 
can recognize and respond to a mirror image of 
themselves. . ." [45] 
But since it is autonomy which is morally 
relevant according to Fox, and linguistic 
ability, it is a fair question to ask whether 
other animals might have some degree of 
autonomy as the result of their cognitive 
sophistication, in 'spite of their lack of 
sophistication in the communication area. 
Developments in cognitive psychology make 
this question very controversial and difficult 
to answer. Jerry Fodor has argued that the 
learning ability of many organisms 
necessitates their having internal 
representational systems which resemble, in 
many ways, the structure of human natural 
language.2 The fact that these systems are 
not deployed as communication systems does 
not detract from the fact that they are used in 
discrimination and concept learning and in the 
confirming and disconfirming of various 
hypostheses. For example, animals such as 
rats, dogs, cats and pigeons are capable of 
learning concepts which have no simple 
physical correlates, including relations such as 
'larger than.' Thus, they cannot, in responding 
correctly. be relying on simple stimulus 
discrimination learning but must have the 
ability to abstract and represent the 
information to themselves. For this and other 
reasons which it would take us too far afield to 
discuss here, many psychologists find the 
postulation of a "language of thought" for 
animals highly plausible and useful.3 
Bu given that animals have such 
representational capacity, it is not possible to 
rule out that some of them have a rudimentary 
self-concept, nor do psychologists find it odd 
to study choice behavior in animals. 
Furthermore, psychologists regularly study 
memory in various species, and goal directed 
behavior. Some philosophers (such as R. G. 
Frey4) balk at talking about beliefs and desires 
in animals, but it is part of Fodor's point that 
talk about concept learning, memories, and 
goal directed behavior requires the postulation 
of a representational system, and here we 
have the essential elements of belief and of 
intention more generally. Namely we have a 
representation of the world in a symbolic 
system together with an attitude toward that 
representation. Perhaps other animals do not 
think "as we do," in the words of a natural 
language, but if they do have goals, memories, 
beliefs and desires, all mediated by an internal 
representational system, then it is not all 
clear that they are different from us in kind 
in respect of these characteristics. Thus, 
autonomy itself may be a matter of degree. It 
seems most likely that other animals possess 
the abilities "[to] choose and decide rationally, 
and engage in self-making or self-realizing 
activities" to various degrees, just as humans 
manifest these highly rational characteristics 
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only some of the time, and for some of us, to a 
very limited degree. Thus, it is not clear that 
autonomy is a trait of the all or nothing 
variety, and as a result it isn't very well 
suited to marking the difference in kind which 
Fox needs to motivate his double standard for 
humans and other species. 
Even supposing autonomy were in some way 
established as a uniquely human characteristic, 
its moral significance needs examining. For, 
as Mary Midgely has pointed out, simply 
establishing that a characteristic is unique 
does not show that its uniqueness is morally 
significant. 5 Fox does not make this mistake, 
however, He argues that autonomy is morally 
important because it is what allows humans to 
enter into a moral community as agents and 
valuers, and it is only such members of a 
moral community who can truly possess value 
and rights. In order to lay the foundation of his 
denial of value to animals, Fox provides an 
account of the nature of value in general. 
VALUE AND VALUERS 
Fox asserts that nature has no value in and of 
itself apart from that value assigned to it by 
valuers---human beings. Let us call this the 
Dependent Value Thesis (DVT). It comes to 
this: nothing has value in and of itself apart 
from being valued by a valuer. Thus, value is 
always a relation between the valued object 
and a valuer. From this claim, Fox concludes 
that the position that animals are inherently 
valuable is literally unintelligible. There are 
serious problems with his defense of the DVT, 
however. 
First, the argument Fox makes for this position 
is primarily negative: he argues that certain 
attempts to justify attributing independent 
value to nature fail. Specifically, he considers 
G. E. Moore's famous thought experiment in 
which we are asked to consider two possible 
universes, one containing whatever the reader 
holds beautiful, the other lacking this, holding 
all else equal including the absence of any 
human beings in either to enjoy or miss the 
.... 
relevant features. Moore's intuition is that the 
beautiful world is preferable to the filthy one, 
that could we do it, we ought to produce it, and 
that the universe would be a better place for 
it, despite the fact that no one, human or 
otherwise, would profit from its existence or 
suffer its absence. Thus, the features that are 
valuable in that beautiful world are valuable 
independently of their use or enjoyment by 
humans or other conscious beings. Fox 
responds to this argument exactly as Bishop 
Berkeley responded centuries earlier to the 
analogous view about the independent existence 
of ordinary physical objects: what the arguer 
of this thought experiment fails to recognize is 
that he is the observerlvaluer in this 
situation. The attempt to conceive of 
something existing unthought of is an 
impossibility, for the one conceiving is himself 
thinking of that thing; analogously, the attempt 
to think of the value of something existing 
independently of a valuer is an impossiblity, 
for the one conceiving of the value is himself a 
valuer. 
Fox's response to Moore seems appropriate. 
One might conclude from it that Moore's 
method is doomed to failure if its point is to 
identify values that exist independently of our 
judgment that they are valuable, for we must 
make the jUdgment that such and such is 
valuable in order to perform the experiment. 
But it does not follow from this negative 
argument, of course, that values are dependent 
in the sense preferred by Fox. To establish 
that would require more than a refutation of 
Moore's attempt to show their independence. 
In fact, the question of whether values are 
independent of the judgment or acts of valuers 
is not so easily resolved as Fox suggests. For 
it is not obviously unintelligible to hold that 
values exist, and that only the recognition of 
values depends on the existence of certain 
kinds of beings, just as one might argue that 
abstract entities (e. g., numbers) exist but 
won't have much impact on the thought of those 
creatures incapable of conceiving them. 
Second, and most importantly, if we grant Fox 
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the Dependent Value Thesis, the conclusion he 
seeks will still not follow, even supposing as 
Fox does, that only human beings are capable 
of being valuers. From the fact that value is 
relative to valuers in this sense, it does not 
follow that animals or nature cannot be 
regarded by valuers as having a value 
independently of some particular relation to 
valuers, such as their usefulness or their 
similarity to us, or the enjoyment we achieve 
in contemplating them. All that is required is 
that valuers ascribe value to that kind of 
object. The appropriateness of placing human 
life as a value over and above all else (i. e., 
anthropocentrism) simply doesn't follow. Fox 
makes a fundamental logical error in inferring 
from the claim that values exist only insofar 
as valuers jUdge them to be so to the claim 
that only valuers (and their kind) can be 
valuable and all other values hinge in some 
sense on our valuing ourselves. 
Perhaps a consideration of this kind of 
aothropocentrism would benefit from a 
consideration of the points commonly made 
regarding the view known as psychological 
egoism. A similar move is made at times by 
proponents of pscyhological egoism, despite 
the fact that it was exposed for the error that 
it is by Bishop Butler some 250 years ag06 : 
the egoist sometimes argues that from the fact 
that I pursue my desires because the 
achievement of them satisfies me, I can 
conclude that what I always really seek is just 
this satisfaction. Thus, all desire, and 
consequently all action is aimed at prompting 
my self-interest. But from the fact that I am 
the one desiring something, and thus the one 
who will achieve the satisfaction or 
frustration of that desire, nothing follows 
about the nature of the object of that desire: 
it need not be myself at all. In fact, as Butler 
(and many others) have pointed out, many of 
the objects that give satisfaction are objects 
that can only be fairly described as concerning 
something other than oneself, for example, the 
well-being of another, and would provide no 
satisfaction if that were not the case. 
Analogously, the fact that human beings are 
valuers does not make human life the only 
valuable thing, or even the one central value to 
which all else must be related to be valuable. 
So, as we have seen, Fox does not establish 
that the very idea of animals or nature having 
value independently of a human decision to 
make it so is unintelligible. 
MORAL COMMUNITY 
While the Dependent Value Thesis provided Fox 
with a metaethical argument against animal 
rights, the central argument against the claim 
that animals are members of the moral 
community is as follows: (1) A moral 
community is a "group whose members share 
certain characteristics and whose members 
are or consider themselves to be bound to 
observe certain rules of conduct in relation to 
one another because of their mutual likeness." 
[49] (2) Clearly only those beings capable of 
functioning within a moral community can be 
members of that community. (3) To function 
here means to possess these characteristics, 
to recognize them in others, to recognize one's 
likeness to others, and as a result to consider 
oneself bound by rules of conduct. (4) Only 
autonomous beings are capable of these things. 
(5) But only human beings (among the known 
species) are fully autonomous in this sense. 
(6) Moral rights exist only in the moral 
community. (7) Since no animal is a member 
of a moral community, (8) no animal is a 
bearer of moral rights. 
The argument looks suspiciously like a 
definitional stop: the moral community is 
simply defined, without justification, as 
consisting of moral agents. Fox's argument 
does not touch those, such as Steve 
Sapontzis, 7 who maintain that animals enjoy 
some degree of moral agency even if they are 
not fully autonomous in Fox's sense. 
Additionally, very few of those who wish to 
argue for membership in the moral community 
of nonhumans would also maintain that animals 
are moral agents, so this definition is clearly 
not one Fox has a right to without argument. 
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None is presented. 
One important test of such an argument 
excluding animals concerns what can be said in 
response to the by now classic problem of 
marginal cases. Ina nutshell, the problem is 
that invoking such characteristics as Fox has 
to argue that there is a gulf between animals 
and humans sufficient to bear the weight of a 
denial of rights for animals seems to imply 
that various kinds of "deficient" or "marginal" 
humans are also excluded from being rights­
bearers---a conclusion with which most would 
not be comfortable. Fox is also uncomfortable 
with this implication, and so he works to show 
that it does not really follow from the 
exclusion of animals from the moral 
community that small infants, the severely 
mentally retarded, senile, autistic, badly 
brain-damaged and comatose individuals are 
also excluded. Unfortunately, it is easier to 
assert that it isn't so than it is to show 
convincingly that our intuitions that it 
shouldn't be are supported by the moral theory 
being proposed. Fox's response---that we are 
justified in partiality to our own species--­
utterly fails to address the challenge. 
The arguments in favor of this species 
partialism appear to be as follows: (1) since 
natural emotional responses and feelings of 
kinship are allowed to count as factors in 
shaping our assessment of the moral status of 
other species, then such feelings may 
legitimately count in assessing the moral 
status of members of our own species. [60] 
Unfortunately, Fox nowhere argues that these 
"natural emotional responses" or "feelings of 
kinship" are morally relevant factors to count 
with regard to animals---certainly they have 
not been allowed to count in the same way that 
he is now proposing to let them count for 
"deficient" humans. For he has just offered an 
argument that denies rights to animals, despite 
such kinship or emotion. This will not, 
therefore, explain why we are justified in 
extending rights to humans who fall outside the 
criterion that excludes animals. (2) "In 
deciding how we ought to look on all these 
classes of individuals, a reasonable position to 
take would seem to be that here membership in 
our own species ought to count for something, 
in the sense in which a charitable attitude 
toward those less developed or less fortunate 
than ourselves, for whom we feel some 
especially close kinship, is particularly 
compelling to a morally mature person." [60] 
At the risk of exposing ourselves as morally 
immature persons, we simply do not see how 
rights are obtained by charity. Rights, after 
all, are reserved on Fox's view for those 
individuals who need them to protect their 
self-development as a being of that kind. [53] 
But, many of the "deficient" individuals being 
considered are incapable of this kind of self­
development. On Fox's view, rights cannot be 
valuable for them. Why, then, is extending 
rights to them an act of charity, if it doesn't 
do the recipient that much good? If it does help 
them after all, then this should give us some 
pause in thinking through Fox's discussion of 
the nature and function of rights and, of 
course, the exclusion of animals from this 
prized position. 
In sum, Fox's position on marginal cases begs 
the question. He thus fails to show why the 
moral community should consist of all and only 
Homo sapiens and our fully autonomous 
cousins, if any. 
WHITHER CRUELTY? 
Being committed to denying that any nonhuman 
can have rights, Fox must find another 
foundation for the moral limits on our use of 
animals, for, as a moderate he certainly 
believes there must be some limits. In recent 
history, such limits have been articulated in 
terms of the avoidance of cruelty and 
unnecessary suffering and the desirability of 
humaneness. Fox falls squarely within this 
traditional framework. He raises the issue 
with the following argument: "If moral 
obligations are contingent on rights and their 
possession by certain beings, then since 
animals have no rights, humans cannot have 
correlative obligations toward them. It 
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follows that we have no duty in the strict 
moral sense to prevent animal suffering." [70] 
If this argument is sound, the problem becomes 
rather pressing for the moderate: what is the 
source of the wrongness of cruelty to animals? 
Fox suggests five reasons for thinking cruelty 
wrong. None of these attributes any kind of 
direct obligation to the victim of that cruelty, 
including, of course, a right not to be harmed. 
While the list is extensive (it includes 
empathy, evolutionary continuity, ecological 
awareness, the demeaningness of cruelty, and 
self interest), Fox does not provide a 
convincing case that these reasons are 
adequate individually or collectively. Most of 
these turn out not to be reasons for the 
wrongness of cruelty at all but, rather, 
historical and descriptive claims about why we
 
happen to react with concern to the suffering
 
of members of other species.
 
With respect to empathy, the closest Fox 
comes to explaining why cruelty is wrong 
comes in his statement that, despite the 
extraordinary difficulty of knowing what it is 
like to be a member of another species, 
"suffering in animals is often easily recognized 
by obvious signs such as cries, grimaces, 
avoidance and defensive behavior, and the like 
and does not require unusual moral sensitivity 
to respond to." [71] Perhaps it does not 
require unusual sensitivity to be moved by the 
suffering of others, including those in another 
species, but the fact that some of us (though 
perhaps not those who are cruel?) do 
empathize with animals does not explain why it 
would be morally wrong to overrule those 
feelings, or to lack them altogether. Again, 
when discussing the evolutionary relatedness 
of Homo sapiens and other species, he states, 
."the awareness of evolutionary continuity 
should engender in us an enhanced sensitivity 
toward other species---their resemblance to 
us, their needs, and their vulnerability." [72] 
Again, Fox seems to have lost sight of the 
question of how such declarations can explain 
the wrongness of cruelty. 
When Fox turns to the idea of cruelty as 
demeaning, he offers some insights worth 
noting. Sometimes the demeaningness of 
cruelty is taken as the causal claim that 
cruelty to animals leads to bad character, and 
thus to a greater likelihood that one's 
conspecifics will be mistreated. This is 
certainly an idea with a history: one finds it 
articulated in Kant's Lectures on Ethics, and 
Kant himself refers to a source as early as the 
mid-18th century (the engravings of William 
Hogarth).8 Despite its pedigree, rarely is 
evidence provided to show that this bit of 
traditional wisdom is in fact true, and Fox does 
a good job exploring this failing. He suggests 
instead that cruelty to animals and later 
cruelty to humans may both be effects of the 
same cause (such as an impoverished childhood 
environment), rather than the one being a 
causal condition of the other. So when Fox 
states that cruelty is demeaning, he does not 
mean that it leads to mistreating humans. 
Rather, he means that it is itself beneath 
human dignity: in acting cruelly one gives 
expression to the worst side of oneself. 
But we ask why cruelty is beneath human 
dignity, or better, why this side of oneself is 
"worst," Fox's answer is that one ignores 
what is morally relevant to his act: "he lets 
himself be insensitive, unmindful of morally 
relevant similarities between himself and the 
animal(s) concerned.. ." [77] This seems 
perilously close to admitting that cruelty is 
wrong because of the wrongness of harming 
the animal itself. What are these similarities 
morally relevant to, if not the jUdgment that 
the harm inflicted is morally relevant to the 
wrongness of the act. 
In the end, Fox's position in The Case for 
Animal Experimentation is that animals enjoy 
an ambiguous moral status: they have 
interests that ought to be considered, but their 
interests are not on a moral par with the 
interests of humans, as they are not rights­
bearers. They are not full members of the 
moral community, but what we do to them is 
not completely morally indifferent. 
Nevertheless, just why what we do to 
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animals is not indifferent is never completely 
clear on Fox's account. It is one thing to say 
that cruelty is a vice, and quite another to 
explain its viciousness without attributing 
value to the victim and also without 
entertaining a causal claim about its effects on 
our dealings with those beings that do have 
value. Unsuspecting readers are likely to 
allow this unintelligible middle ground because 
it gives expression to the comfortable 
platitude that cruelty to animals is wrong. 
Fox's general arguments in the first half of the 
book do not succeed, then, in providing the 
solid middle ground he seeks. For, on the one 
hand, he fails to show convincingly why other 
animals are so different from humans that they 
deserve exclusion from the moral community 
of rights holders. On the other hand, even if 
we were to accept Fox's arguments for 
excluding them, he provides no convincing 
reasons why we should worry about cruelty to 
animals. It is no wonder Fox describes the 
moral position he has carved out for animals as 
"ambiguous." Just how ambiguous this position 
is becomes clear when Fox turns his attention 
specifically to the uses of animals in research. 
IN THE LABORATORY 
The first task Fox sets himself when he turns 
to experimentation is that of putting animal 
research in context. What this means is that 
Fox will show us, by adding in the details, 
rationale and benefits of various experiments, 
that they are really not as bad as their 
detractors in the animal welfare community 
would have us believe. Thus, he takes on some 
of the most notorious research, such as 
Harlow's experiments on social isolation in 
infant monkeys, and Seligman's learned 
helplessness research. .What will count as a 
vlnolcation, on Fox's terms? He cautions 
against overly simple formulae for determining 
whether an experiment is justified but does 
offer a principle of proportionality: the actual 
or potential benefits must be directly 
proportional to the amount of SUffering the 
experiment entails. In the case of very 
stressful experiments, such as Harlow's, the 
•
 
benefits must be "considerably in excess· of 
the harm caused. [114] On Fox's own 
arguments this criterion is entirely 
unworkable. He argues in Chapter 5 it is often 
impossible to determine in advance of 
performing an experiment whether that 
experiment will reap benefits, and many 
important discoveries have been made entirely 
serendipitously. [139] In fact, this inability to 
predict the value of research, and the 
consequent need for basic research in science, 
is one of the more important points Fox makes 
in the entire book. But it makes any advance 
attempt to weigh the importance of research 
against amount of suffering induced impossible. 
Yet the proportionality criterion must be used 
in advance if it is to shed any light. 
Furthermore, virtually any research which is 
well-conceived and of interest to the scientific 
community can pass his test, since it can 
always be argued that such research may 
eventually have some applications. Thus, 
Fox's criterion is inconsistent with his own 
correct analysis of the nature of science. 
Even assuming we could measure benefits in 
advance, and that we knew how to weigh 
benefits against amount of suffering induced by 
an experiment, the proportionality criterion 
Fox employs entirely ignores the obvious 
questions of whether there were alternatives 
to the research he is attempting to vindicate 
and whether the research does reliably 
generalize to humans. It may be worth 
considering just one example of research 
which Fox attempts to justify to see how 
crucial these questions are. In the case of 
Harlow's maternal deprivation experiments, 
there was a variety of clinical data available 
on the effects of maternal deprivation in 
humans before Harlow conducted his 
experiments. For example, Wayne Dennis 
made many clinical observations in institutions 
during the 1940s, and he even carried out an 
experiment on social deprivation in human 
infants by rearing two infants in isolation! In 
fact, there is a wealth of evidence from the 
40s through the 60s, documenting the effects 
of maternal deprivation, often under well 
controlled conditions in orphanages. 
I' 
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Furthermore, this data was very likely 
superior to that obtained by the Harlows, since 
there are serious doubts about the 
generalizability of the results of such studies 
from one species to another. Ruppenthal and 
Fahrenbrech found results for rhesus monkeys 
and pigtail macaques to be importantly 
different. 11 
What is ironic and unfortunate about Fox's 
analysis of this and other examples of painful 
research is that while he claims that a more 
detailed understanding of the surrounding 
context will vindicate the experiments, he has 
not dug deeply enough into the surrounding 
context to answer or even to raise the crucial 
questions of alternatives and generalizability. 
Thus, Fox undermines his claim to being an 
objective and independent inquirer regarding 
such experiments. This is revealed quite 
clearly in his glowing reports of research 
procedures which he was allowed to observe 
and which he describes as "exemplary from 
both aseptic and humane viewpoints." [122] 
From his personal observations of animal 
experiments, Fox concludes that mistreatment 
of animals is anomalous. He uncritically 
accepts the assurances of researchers, and it 
never seems to occur to him that there might 
be any bias in the cases he observed as a 
function of his very presence. Nor does it 
occur to him to raise obvious questions 
regarding the reassurances he is offered. For 
example, Fox describes the burn research 
being conducted upon pigs at Toronto's Hospital 
for Sick Children. He is reassured that the 
third degree burns inflicted upon the animals 
are painless, since nerve endings in the burn 
area are destroyed. [119] But what about 
other sources of suffering such an experiment 
produces, such as severe infection and fever, 
pain associated with the removal of skin for 
grafting, and stress due to immobilization? 
Apparently it didn't occur to Fox to ask these 
questions. 
In spite of all these difficulties, Fox's 
discussion of the nature of scientific inquiry is 
quite good. As already noted, Fox points out 
the impossibility of predicting the applications 
and benefits of various experiments and 
research programs, and thus the 
inappropriateness of demands that research on 
animals be restricted to only those which are 
clearly of immediate and life-saving 
importance. This type of restriction is indeed 
impossible, and those who wish merely to 
red uce the number of experiments exploiting 
animals along these lines should take note. 
Furthermore, Fox is quite right in pointing out 
the need, in scientific research, for a certain 
amount of replication. [145] It is important to 
distinguish a redundant experiment (done in a 
teaching context or because the researcher 
does not realize that the experiment has 
already been performed) from a legitimate 
attempt to replicate an experiment. If the 
outcome of an experiment is unexpected, 
appearing to imply the need to change some 
assumptions which are well established, 
replication may be especially important. 
Finally, Fox correctly points out that the 
statistical nature of biological and 
psychological "laws" and the amount of 
variability present in much of these areas of 
inquiry sometimes require a large number of 
experimental subjects be used. So certain 
requests for reductions in numbers of animals 
or in replication of experiments could result in 
making the research truly pointless. 
Nevertheless, Fox does not provide any 
examples of critics of animal research actually 
making these sorts of mistakes; he merely 
accuses "critics of animal research of 
generally misunderstanding" these points. In 
The Case for Animal Experimentation Fox has a 
habit of generalizing about the mistakes and 
foibles of the animal rights community without 
reference to specific examples. 
An examination of Fox's own suggestions 
regarding reform reveals the fundamental 
difficulty with the cost/benefit approach to 
reform. Is the testing of cosmetics a trivial 
enough benefit to be overruled by the serious 
degree of suffering it induces? Even here Fox 
is equivocal and appears to view testing as 
justified, at least until alternatives can be 
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found. In response to the argument that 
animals should not be sacrificed just to protect 
people from inessentials like cosmetics, Fox 
quotes the following passage with approval: 
Antivivisectionists sometimes assert that 
animals should not be "made to pay" for human 
"sins"...But we live in a deterministic world, 
and the concept of "retribution" is not 
appropriate. Human life is more important to 
the culture than animal life is, regardless of 
the conditions that cause humans to engage in 
behavior that is dangerous to themselves. 
[183] 
It seems that in here endorsing the 
"deterministic world" Fox has conveniently 
forgotten that autonomy---i. e., human 
freedom---was to be the distinguishing feature 
setting humans apart from other animals. But 
what is even more revealing here is Fox's 
willingness to allow that human needs, even 
artificial, detrimental desires, can expand to 
overrule the most fundamental interests of 
animals. We must ask what would be an 
example of human need so trivial, and animal 
suffering so great, that it simply could not be 
justified? In examining Fox's suggestions for 
reform, it is difficult to answer this question, 
for phrases such as "reasonable expectation 
that such studies will contribute significantly" 
and "...experimental animals are not to be 
SUbjected to unnecessary pain or distress" 
[208] are highly elastic. What counts as 
reasonable? Necessary? And necessary for 
what? 
Fox's insightful discussion of science reveals 
the extreme difficulties confronting attempts 
to reform animal research and reduce the 
numbers of animals used. This quagmire of 
difficulties makes principled approaches more 
workable than attempts to balance interests on 
a case by case basis. This suggests either 
abolition of animal research or absolute 
limitations on what can be done, along the lines 
of the Nuremberg guidelines. This is one 
important lesson animal welfarists can learn 
from a careful reading of Fox: moderate 
positions may in fact be less practical and 
workable than more extreme reforms designed 
to make the rights of animal subjects the 
bottom line in considering what can and cannot 
be done in research. 
In fairness, Fox does seek reforms which 
would improve the conditions of laboratory 
animals, such as prohibiting multiple survival 
surgery as a classroom instruction procedure. 
He also promotes education and dialogue, and 
the use of ethics review boards. 11 While some 
of the reforms he suggests are commendable ( 
and some are already in place), Fox's 
recommendations are for the most part as 
ambiguous as the moral perspective which 
stands behind them. 
CONCLUSK:>N 
The Case for Animal Experimentatjon is a book 
that will infuriate animal rights advocates and 
please some who think the case for animals' 
rights weak and a diversion from more 
important matters. Among other things, pro­
animal activists such as the ALF are villified 
on these pages for violent acts, while little 
attention is paid to the good they have done--­
e. g., in revealing for public scrutiny the 
reality of laboratory life in such places as the 
Carol B_langer Grafton. 
Old-Fashioned Animal ~. 
Nell York; Dover, L981 
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University of Pennsylvania head injury lab. 
Beyond this, the author sets himself up as 
providing a rational assessment of the moral 
status of animals and the implications this has 
for scientific research employing them, an 
assessment in opposition to the often irrational 
and emotional pro-animal literature. The 
fallacious arguments and appeals in this book, 
of which there are many, will be all the more 
infuriating to those who clearly are not its 
intended audience. And the oft-repeated 
chorus that his opponents' view is clouded by a 
failure to think clearly, consistently, 
unemotionally, and objectively will seem all 
the more ironic to those familiar with Fox's 
subsequent renunciation of the major thesis of 
the book as itself arbitrary. If it achieves 
nothing else, animal activists can learn from 
this book how offputting irrational appeals are 
to those not already convinced of the author's 
position (and to those careful thinkers who are 
in agreement). 
But there is more to be learned from a 
consideration of Fox's book, for after all, the 
discussions resulting from its publication led 
Fox himself to change his views. Fox's 
courageous turnaround should give us hope for 
the possibility of nonviolent and rational 
change in the direction of greater respect for 
animals through such dialogue. 
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